A Failing State?

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By Eduardo Pizarro and Ana Maria Bejarano

Is Colombia’s state a “failing state'? Does Colombia run the risk of a state collapse? This Latin American nation has worried the international community for several years. One of the worse humanitarian catastrophes in the world, Colombia averages more than 25,000 murders yearly. Two million refugees have fled from their homes; thousands of acres of forest have been destroyed to plant coca, marijuana or poppies; massacres are permanently perpetrated either by delirious extreme left wing groups or by criminal groups of the extreme right.

The so-called “failing states” have become one of the central concerns in the new post-cold-war international agenda. Increasing and alarming cases of collapsed states have occurred in different parts of the world: Lebanon, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sudan or Somalia. Colombia has not been left outside of this debate. Some authors argue that Colombia is a palpable example of a “state in the brink of failure.” Others, with an apocalyptic viewpoint, have come to affirm that the country is ad portas of an imminent collapse, because of a threat of secession of territorial sections between the country's southern region supposedly controlled by the guerrillas, the north apparently dominated by extreme right paramilitary groups, and the center under the control of the current state.

The international community's growing interest in the instability of some states come from different sources. In the first place, there is a clear connection with humanitarian issues: cases of state precariousness are generally accompanied by multiple humanitarian disasters (massacres, forced displacement of population, massive violations of human rights, etc.). Second, the interest on state collapse is linked with a concern for global safety: In a highly interconnected and inter-independent world, the inability of a state to guarantee a minimum of order and security inside its frontiers has an immediate regional and even a world impact. In the words of Robert Rotberg, Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University, “state failure threatens global stability because national governments have become the primary building blocks of order. International security relies on states to protect against chaos at home and limit the cancerous spread of anarchy beyond their borders and throughout the world” (Foreign Affairs, 2002, No. 4, p. 130). Thirdly, after September 11, 2001, the ease with which international terrorist networks may take shelter in countries that suffer deep internal disorders, as has happened in Afghanistan or Sudan has become painfully evident. In Colombia, three experts in explosives from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are on trial for their ties to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

COLOMBIA: “THE PARTIAL COLLAPSE OF THE STATE”

How can a “failing state” be distinguished from a “collapsed state”? Rotberg argues that collapsed states “are rare and an extreme version of a failed states are typified by an absence of authority. Indeed, a collapsed state is a shell of a polity” (idem., p. 133). The emblematic model of a “collapsed state” is Somalia where even the last traces of a central government have disappeared. On the contrary, failing states still have a certain level of “stateness”, but in the midst of an increasing deterioration of their capacity to guarantee a minimum of order and security, that usually does not go further than the main urban centers.

Are these notions adequate for understanding the Colombian case? Many of Colombia's characteristics in the present situation are similar to those featured by collapsing states (see State Collapse and Early Response): for example, the brutal displacement of peasants from rural zones to urban centers or the existence of powerful paramilitary groups. However from our perspective, it is quite difficult that a state collapse will take place in Colombia in the same way it has occurred in other countries. This basically is due to two factors: on the one hand, different from most African countries and many Asian nations, formed like “arbitrary units” after de-colonization, Colombia, like the rest of Latin America, has a long history of construction of a national state. Colombia, like most of the Andean region, may be faced with a “weak state” but in no way a “shadow state”.

In addition, the phenomenon of collapsed states is strongly related to conflicts that involve diverse ethnic, religious, national or linguistic identities, like in Sri Lanka or Kosovo. Colombia is, ethnically speaking, one of the region's most homogeneous countries: it is a mestizo country with a Catholic majority, with an indisputable predominance of Spanish and without any regionalist centrifugal tendencies. On the other hand, far from being a polarized nation divided by ideological reasons, the immense Colombian majority rejects the violent actors. The guerrilla groups and the paramilitary organizations count with a minimal support: less than 2% of the population, according to recent opinion polls.

From a historical and comparative perspective, the Colombian state has always been small, poor and weak. The historical roots of this weakness can be summarized in a few lines. In the first place, it is related with a vast territory crossed by a very complex geography, one of the world's most difficult, which has given origin to a multiplicity of markets and disperse populations. According to the “fragmentation index of population” of the Inter American Development Bank (IDB) Colombia occupies the 3rd place in a list of 155 countries.

On the other hand, only during the first decades of the 20th century Colombia did achieve the stabilization of a export commodity linking it with in the world market (coffee), which gave origin to a late industrialization process, yielding a precarious base of resources for the State. Finally, it is important to stress that in Colombia the strategic resource, coffee, was in private hands thus generating a small income to the central State. Former Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen’s prologue to English historian Malcolm Deas' book Del poder y la gramática, y otros ensayos sobre historia, política y literatura colombianas (Bogotá, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1993 p. 14): “beginning with these numbers, the destiny of Colombians is better understood. Unflagging fighters, full time workers in the most adverse circumstances, they have managed to survive without winning any lottery, with no frontier with the U.S. like Mexico has, or oil like Venezuela, or Cuba’s tourism (in its time), or the grains and cattle like Argentina and Uruguay, or Brazil’s large extension of territory. It all conspired against the survival of the Colombian State, which only from 1975 began to perceive its own income different from tax revenue, from State coal, the surplus of official oil for export and the Cerromatoso nickel. Deas correctly points out that for decades the only inheritance the Colombian State had, were the salt mines. Getting its own income, something Colombia never had, has been the great transformation in the last 20 years of the 20th century.”

The weak Colombian institutions were deeply challenged on two occasions during the 20th century; in both cases, the country suffered a “partial collapse of the State” (Paul Oquist). In other words, some state institutions maintained their solidity, while others broke down. The first partial collapse occurred in the middle of the 20th century, when Colombia suffered the last of the bi-partisan civil wars during the tragic period known as “La Violencia”. At the end of the 80s a similar situation occurred as a consequence of the so-called “double war,” the combination of the war against the narco-terrorism of the drug cartels and the war against the insurgents. The weak and precarious Colombian state faced challenges and demands that went beyond its capacity. Deep “geological fissures”, were revealed, particularly in key institutions in charge of justice and security.

The expressions of this “partial collapse of the state” became evident in the late 1980s. Its most visible face has been the growth of criminal statistics. At the beginning of the 1990s, Colombia had the highest homicide rate in the world (80 homicides for each 100.000 habitants), far from the already worrisome index shown by Latin America (30) and also from the very high index of the U.S. (8), not to mention the astronomical distance that separates it from the European countries (1.5). But the terrible criminal rates are just one dramatic expression of the State’s erosion in carrying out its most important tasks. On the one hand, the deep inefficiencies of the National Police were obvious: there were constant revelations of corruption at all levels, negative experiences by the citizenry with an authoritarian and repressive police, indications of police involvement in thefts, “social cleansing” or massacres. The police profession was the least prestigious of the social scale. On the other hand, in the face of violent escalation and police incapacity, the elites decide to opt for private security, thus spawning an unprecedented peak of private companies dedicated to security and surveillance whose members came to duplicate the number of the National Police. This “privatization of security” was accompanied by the financing of groups for social cleansing in urban centers in order to decrease the criminality rates.

Others would follow this first privatization of security. The military’s incapacity to undermine the strategic “diffuse expansion” of the guerrilla throughout the country resulted in the privatization of the counter-insurgency. First came the legal constitution of self-defense groups under the National Security Law (law 48 of 1968). Later, when President Virgilio Barco annulled this law, support grew for the formation of illegal paramilitary groups.

Another state sector deeply affected by this progressive state erosion has been the justice system. Impunity levels have reached scandalous numbers in Colombia. If in the 1970s 11% of those accused for murder were condemned, 20 years later this number had come down 4%. A murder has more than a 90% chance of going unpunished.

Finally this state erosion is expressed in a dramatic increase in the number of weapons owned by the civil population, the strengthening of some armed groups that defy the state’s authority (particularly the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN and the paramilitary group, Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), and the lack of state presence in some of the country’s regions, particularly in the areas of recent colonization. In many of these regions there have emerged “praetorian systems,” defined by Samuel Huntington as situations where different social segments confront each other directly for the distribution of power and income, for lack of the legal institutions necessary to intermediate and solve conflict.

State Reconstruction

At the beginning of the 90s, while the proposal of the minimal state dominated in the world of ideas, Colombia undertook a serious process of strengthening of state institutions, particularly in the areas responsible for justice and security. Today, Colombia counts on a larger and more efficient state than 15 years ago, thanks to a strong internal fiscal effort, as well as resources from international cooperation and aid, including the U.S. supported Plan Colombia.

Part of this state reconstruction, has been a serious effort at rebuilding the National Police. In 1993 the Defense Ministry convoked two commissions, one internal and the other one external to study police reform: their recommendations were translated into law 62 of 1993. This has implied a profound renovation of the Police to the point of making it into one of the most professional and trustworthy in Latin America. There has also been a substantial improvement of the judicial institutions, which are still confronted with hyper-violence and its consequences (judicial crowding, impunity). This has brought important victories in the fight against collective violent actors (for example, against the members of the big drug cartels). Finally, in the last few years, the Armed Forces have been strengthened (in budget, number of men and technology), allowing this institution to recover the military initiative in detriment of the guerrilla and paramilitary groups. It is a process of institutional reconstruction that comes late, given that the country was already in a situation of hyper-violence, subjugated by the illegal drug traffic and with strong armed actors that disputed the state’s control over large portions of national territory. However this process of state reconstruction has the potential to stop the deepening of the crisis. If this effort is sustained, it may be possible that Colombia will, in the mid-term, overcome the partial collapse of its state.

Eduardo Pizarro is Associate Professor at the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI) de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia and currently Visiting Fellow at the Program in Latin American Studies at Princeton University.

Ana María Bejarano is assistant professor at the Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá) and currently Visiting Fellow at the Program in Latin America Studies and lecturer in the Politics Department at Princeton University.

The Christian-evangelicalDMG interpersonal (DMG, former: 'German Missionary Fellowship') based at Buchenauerhof in Sinsheim, claims to be one of the largest Protestant missions in Germany.^[1] The legal status is a non-profit registered association. Director and Chairman of the Board is Günther Beck.^[2]

Aims[edit]

The DMG offers young people, Christian professionals and theologians, the opportunity to serve cross-culturally as a missionary as part of a network of 105 international partner organizations ^[3] and churches in 80 countries around the world.^[4] DMG offers a short-term mission program (6–24 months) for mostly young people aged 18 or older,^[5] a medium-term commitment (two to four years), long-term assignments (more than two years)^[6] as well as a “50-plus program“, which allows older Christians to use their experience and professional knowledge to help people in other countries ^[7] In 2018 they had 45 short-terms^[8]

The workers seek to live the gospel in word and deed, alleviating suffering, helping people holistically contributing to the circulation of the Bible and to building of Christian communities on four continents. This is done in close partnership and cooperation with the people, churches and Christian organizations on the ground.

History[edit]

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Founded in 1951 in Beatenberg (Switzerland) as the „German Missionary Fellowship, Association for Charity e. V.“ (DMG), the organization had its first office in a small attic in Stuttgart-Korntal. The first overseas worker Helmut Gaertner was sent to Spain in 1953, where he produced Christian radio broadcasts. Gaertner was later involved in the founding of the ERF-Medien in Germany. By the 1960s, the DMG had around 100 people working worldwide. In 1971 the Christian charity moved to the Buchenauerhof, Sinsheim. Today, around 400 people are employed in various projects around the world. Over the years, DMG built up a network of partnerships with more than 100 churches and nonprofit organizations around the world. DMG supports churches in central Europa in sending Christians to work in the partners projects. In January 2014, DMG was renamed: DMG interpersonal. The new logo was combined with the slogan “so people meet God“.^[9]

Work areas[edit]

About 405 DMG-workers^[10] around the globe are active in the following areas: 'Building Christian communities, pioneering new projects, theological teaching ministry, children’s, youth and student mission, relief, famine relief, linguistics, Bible translations, literature production, evangelism, Radio Mission, medical service, agricultural development assistance, flying services, AIDS and hygiene consultancy, assistance for street children, training of teachers, nurses, educators etc.

Global cooperation[edit]

In collaboration with 105 local churches and international partner organizations and aid agencies^[11] the staff of the German Mission Community works in the following countries and continents:^[12]

• Europe: Belgium, France, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine.
• Asia:^[13] CIS, Central Asia, Mongolia, East Asia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Southeast Asia, Japan, Pakistan and the Orient.
• Africa: North Africa, Senegal, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Benin, Ethiopia, South Sudan, DR. Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi,^[14] Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Madagascar, Angola, Namibia and South Africa.
• America: Canada, USA, Mexico, Haiti, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Chile.

In addition there are currently around 50 short-term workers with DMG working around the world.^[15]The DMG's workers come from Protestant Landeskirchen, Free churches and from various Christian churches from around 20 countries, mostly from Germany, Austria and Switzerland. These Christian churches send their cross-cultural workers as employees of DMG interpersonal.

Membership[edit]

The DMG is member of “netzwerk-m“ (former: “Ring Missionarischer Jugendbewegungen, RMJ)“ (ring of missionary youth movements)^[16] and “Arbeitsgemeinschaft Evangelikaler Missionen (AEM)” (association of evangelical missions). It’s committed to the guiding principles of the Evangelische Allianz.^[17] This binds them theologically and at the principles on the use of donations.

Honors[edit]

• Dietrich Schmoll, who was working for the medical service of the DMG for many years, was awarded with the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany.^[18]
• Ursula Schmitz, who died in 2009, was a DMG missionary doctor in the Christian hospital “Tank” in northeast Pakistan and worked there for 20 years. 2010 she received posthumously the highest Order of Merit of the Republic of Pakistan.^[19]
• Andreas Hahn, a theologian formerly active in Wroclaw, received the Johann-Tobias-Beck-Preis 2010 (award) of the “Arbeitskreis für evangelikale Theologie” (working group awarded for evangelical theology). The prize of 1000 euros was awarded in December 2010.^[20]
• Rose Schwarz, who was working for a medical help project in Kenya was awarded the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany in 2014.
• Detlef Blöcher, former director until 2018

Publications of the DMG[edit]

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• Magazine 'DMG-informiert' (DMG-informs), run: 44,000, spread mainly in Central Europe, also known as e-paper^[21]
• Books and audio books for children and adults^[22]

References[edit]

1. ^see epdArchived July 1, 2010, at WebCite: „Mission erleben und erlebbar machen“.
2. ^contact-page on www.dmgint.de.
3. ^'Our partners - DMG'. www.dmgint.de. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
4. ^Selbstbeschreibung auf www.dmgint.de: Who we are
5. ^'Kurzeinsatz - DMG'. www.dmgint.de. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
6. ^'Come to Germany - DMG'. www.dmgint.de. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
7. ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on February 11, 2007. Retrieved November 20, 2018.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
8. ^'Jahresrückblick 2018 – ein herzliches Danke - DMG'. www.dmgint.de. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
9. ^'Geschichte der DMG'. Retrieved May 28, 2014.
10. ^'Jahresrückblick 2018 – ein herzliches Danke - DMG'. www.dmgint.de. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
11. ^e. g. Serving In Mission (SIMArchived November 13, 2007, at the Wayback Machine; PDF; 1,7 MB).
12. ^'SIM Links that Liberate: Partners in Sending – DMG Germany'. Retrieved September 7, 2010.^{[permanent dead link]}
13. ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on October 7, 2007. Retrieved September 20, 2016.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link)
14. ^'Malawi-Bible.net'. Archived from the original on November 21, 2008. Retrieved October 2, 2007.
15. ^'Jahresrückblick 2018 – ein herzliches Danke - DMG'. www.dmgint.de. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
16. ^'Archived copy'. Archived from the original on September 28, 2007. Retrieved October 2, 2007.CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link) of RMJ
17. ^'list of members'. Archived from the original on September 27, 2007. Retrieved February 27, 2010.
18. ^'Verdienstkreuz am Bande für Dietrich Schmoll'. Staatsministerium Baden-Württemberg. Archived from the original on June 28, 2010. Retrieved June 28, 2010.
19. ^'Ev. Nachrichtenagentur idea – Pakistan: Missionsärztin posthum mit höchstem Orden geehrt'. Retrieved July 3, 2010.^{[permanent dead link]}
20. ^'Johann-Tobias-Beck-Preis 2010'(PDF). Retrieved July 23, 2010.^{[permanent dead link]}
21. ^'Zeitschrift (DMG-informiert) - DMG'. www.dmgint.de. Retrieved July 17, 2019.
22. ^see: Vier Töchter und ein arabischer Prinz

External links[edit]

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• Official Website (German)
• Official Website (English)

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